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Abstract
In an interesting article Wieteke van Dijk and colleagues argue that societal developments and values 
influence the practice of medicine, and thus can result in both medicalisation and overdiagnosis. They provide 
a convincing argument that overdiagnosis emerges in a social context and that it has socially constructed 
implications. However, they fail to show that overdiagnosis per se is socially constructed and how this 
construction occurs. Moreover, the authors discuss overdiagnosis on a micro level without acknowledging that 
overdiagnosis cannot be observed in individuals “in the doctor’s office.” We cannot tell whether a diagnosed 
person is overdiagnosed or not. This is the core of the problem. Despite these shortcomings, Wieteke van 
Dijk and her colleagues are certainly on to something important, and they should be encouraged to elaborate 
their perspective. We certainly need to deepen our understanding of the social construction of overdiagnosis. 
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In an interesting and important article Wieteke van Dijk and colleagues argue that societal developments and values influence the practice of medicine, and thus can result in 
both medicalisation and overdiagnosis.1 They point out that 
while the social aspects of medicalization are acknowledged, 
more emphasis should be placed on the societal aspects of 
overdiagnosis. 
To make their point they underscore the value-ladenness 
of disease. Where we decide set our cut-off values (for 
hypertension for example) depends on risk assessments, and 
ultimately on our norms and values. Furthermore, focusing 
on specific risk factors (such as hypertension) may make us 
ignore a wide range of other important factors, such as life 
style and socioeconomic context, they argue. Our social 
propensity to look for quick fixes deflects our focus from 
important aspects. Hence, our social norms and values make 
us receptive for overdiagnosis. 
To illustrate how social aspects influence both medicalization 
and overdiagnosis they use three examples: care for the 
mentally disabled, treatment for Alzheimer disease, and 
medicalization of childbirth. The examples underscore how 
indication thresholds and diseases are socially constructed. 
Van Dijk and colleagues conclude that “[m]edicalisation and 
overdiagnosis hold an ambivalent relationship.” Their main 
point is that (a) medicalization “follows from overdiagnosis 
in the doctor’s office” and that (b) overdiagnosis follows from 
societal norms and values (facilitating medicalization). 
Although van Dijk and colleagues are very close to my own 
conceptions of both overdiagnosis and medicalization,2-5 I 
think their perspective deserves some further reflection. Allow 
me to consider their last claim first, ie, that overdiagnosis is 
the implication of societal norms and values. This is a fairly 
trivial statement and very few would disagree. The authors 
fail to make it clear to what extent overdiagnosis as such, and 
not only its implications, is a social construction. Pointing 
to the fact that indication thresholds and cut-off values are 
derived from social norms and values does not do the trick, 
because these thresholds decide the level of uncertainty we 
are willing to accept, ie, how we trade off false positive against 
false negative test results. For example, a radiologist may be 
more afraid of missing pathology (and accepting more false 
positives) than the referring general practitioner (GP), who 
on her side may be more focused on a conclusive diagnosis 
(and accepting more false negatives). However, it is important 
to notice that the issue with thresholds and cut-off values is the 
social (or professional) acceptance of false results. However, 
overdiagnosis is about correct test results. 
As the authors rightly point out, overdiagnosis is defined as the 
detection of abnormalities that will never cause symptoms or 
death. The abnormalities that are overdiagnosed are correctly 
identified. They are true positives.6 Hence, overdiagnosis 
is not about how we trade off two types of test error, it is 
about how we handle a specific type of uncertainty, ie, the 
uncertainty of whether a given condition (“abnormality”) will 
cause symptoms, disease, or death. Certainly, it is about risk 
aversion. If we are very much afraid of a certain disease, we 
will go great lengths to detect and defeat it7 and we will accept 
harms, such as overdiagnosis, to do so. Undoubtedly, our risk 
aversion is socially constructed, and our eagerness to find 
conditions that may result in disease is socially constructed. 
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Surely, this explains how we come to accept overdiagnosis 
and its extension, but it does not explain how overdiagnosis 
as such is socially constructed. Hence, we still need van Dijk 
and colleagues to help us explain how exactly overdiagnosis is 
socially constructed. 
Allow me now to turn to the authors’ first insight, ie, that 
medicalization “follows from overdiagnosis in the doctor’s 
office.” Here it may be fruitful to pay attention to two important 
aspects of overdiagnosis. First, that overdiagnosis does not 
appear in the doctor’s office. In her office, the doctor only 
sees the patient and the (true) positive test result. She does not 
know whether the patient will develop symptoms or disease 
or die as a consequence of having the detected condition. And 
when treating the patient for the identified condition, the 
doctor will never know whether the patient in her office is 
overdiagnosed. The patient will never know either. And both 
will happily think that a life has been saved. This is called “the 
popularity paradox.”8,9 Therefore, you have to be prophetic 
to observe overdiagnosis in the individual2 (“in the doctor’s 
office”) and overdiagnosis can only be measured indirectly on 
a populational level10 or as a pathological reserve.8,11 
Second, the authors are correct in underscoring that both 
“overdiagnosis and medicalisation result in more people 
receiving a medical diagnosis.” However, overdiagnosis 
does not result in medicalization. Overdiagnosis does not 
medicalize a condition, because it is already medical.5 Ductal 
carcinoma in situ (DCIS) and colorectal polyps are already 
identified as medically relevant conditions, ie, conditions that 
potentially can result in harmful or deadly disease, ie, breast 
cancer and colorectal cancer respectively. Again, we may 
very well dwell with the social conditions that make these 
conditions (DCIS and polyps) medically relevant and make 
us screen for them. However, this does not make the persons 
with the overdiagnosed conditions medicalized. 
Of course, the same norms and values may be identified 
in medicalization as in the process of overdiagnosis. They 
may even have the same drivers12 and mechanisms, such as 
“the increasing societal consciousness of conditions and its 
treatments, decreasing the individual and societal tolerance to 
endure everyday complaints.”1 However, this is different than 
saying that overdiagnosis is socially constructed. 
My concerns may of course be based on my misreading of 
van Dijk and colleagues, and if this is that case I sincerely 
apologize. But if I have understood them well and even 
if my critique is relevant, I do think that they have a good 
case. Overdiagnosis is an obvious candidate for being a social 
construction. My point is only that more work is needed. 
Wieteke van Dijk and colleagues’ contributions to this work 
are most welcome and needed.
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